![]() ![]() "Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources." World Development 29 (10):1649-1672. Cambridge: Massachussetts: Harvard University Press.Īgrawal, Arun. High levels of cooperation help to sustain the commons that is being managed.Ĭommunity-based natural resource management (CBNRM) This is more applicable to local self-governance cases than cases where the group in question is the target of a policy. ![]() Low transaction costs of decision making and monitoring facilitate cooperation vis a vis resource management. Smaller groups face lower transaction costs (e.g., for monitoring, decision making.) The smaller the group the easier to design management rules and to monitor compliance Project SESMAD Sector(s) Scientific Field Component Type(s) Actor Status Public For example, with taxes or subsidies and PES schemes, the greater the number of individuals taxed or subsidized, the higher the transaction costs involved, and the more difficult it can be to successfully implement the policy.Īdditionally, heterogeneity is likely to increase with group size, and with it also comes the possibility for disagreements over the management of the commons. Within the literature on policy instrument choice and environmental governance, it is mentioned that the size of the group that is the target of a policy is similarly important. Finally, as shown by social movements scholars, larger groups also have more political power, potentially contributing to enhanced local autonomy to devise locally-appropriate institutions. Theoretically, while larger group size leads to a decreased individual contribution, it also leads to an increased collective provision, making larger investments more feasible (see Poteete and Ostrom 2004). different combinations with other variables, including institutions themselves) mediate the effect of group size (Agrawal 2001 Poteete and Ostrom 2004). However, while there is consensus on the fact that group size and heterogeneity influence the likelihood of collective action -in particular the level of trust and of convergence of interests- there is no such consensus about the particular effect which these variables have and how does context (i.e. As group size decreases, it is plausible to think that interactions between users increase, which consequently increases the importance of reputation in the group and facilitates monitoring, and that it is easier to monitor other users.Īlso, heterogeneity (see Interest Heterogeneity and Cultural Heterogeneity theories) is likely to increase with group size, and with it also the chances of disagreements over the management of the commons. 2004), this relationship has mostly been discussed within the context of community-based natural resource management, and the theory explains variation in the abilities of different groups to act collectively in order to manage their own resource. As discussed by Olson (1965), group size increases the transaction costs (Transaction Costs) of decision making and monitoring increase, and decreases the chances of successful collaborative governance (Collective Action). Group size (Group Size) affects cooperative management of environmental commons in several ways. Group size and collective action Variable relationship: ![]()
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